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[L. A. No. 24145.

In Bank.

Mar. 22, 1957.]

Estate of WILLINORE M. FOSSELMAN, Deceased. HARRIET PALMER, Appellant, v. CHARLE~ F. SALKELD, as Executor, etc. et a1.. Respondents.
[1] Wills-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-Testamentary incompetency on a given day may be proved by evidence of incompetency at times prior to and after the day in question.
[2] Id.-Testamentary Capacity-Presumptions and Inferences.When it is shown that testamentary incompetency exists and
that it is caused by a mental disorder of a general and con"
tinuous nature, the inference is reasonable, and there may
even be a legal presumption (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963,· subd. 32),
that the incompetency continues to exist, and such an inference
is particularly strong where decedent was suffering from senile
dementia.
[3] Id.-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-A determination that
testatrix was of unsound mind when she executed holographic
documents offered for probate as codicils to her will was sustained by testimony of a bank official, an attorney, a doctor'
and a psychiatrist from which the trial court could reasonably
conclude that during a three-year period prior to her death
the testatrix was suffering from senile dementia in an advanced stage and that she could not comprehend the extent
and character of her property or her relation to those who
would be the natural objects of her bounty, while said documents were executed during the last two years.
(4a.,4b] Id.-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-A determination
that testatrix was suffering from an insane delusion as to a
legatee's identity, and that such delusion was the effective
cause of the execution of purported codicils, was sustained by
evidence that she persistently claimed that the legatee was an
old friend who had worked for testatrix' mother despite repeated explanations to the contrary.

[1) See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 10; Am.Jur., Wills, § 104.
!ticK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 45(1); [2] Wills, 163; (I!
Wills, § 71; [4] Wills, 176; L6J Wills, § 69.
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[5] ld.-Testamentary Capacity-Burden of Proof.-Contestants
have the burden to prove not only that testatrix was suffering
from a claimed insane delusion as to a legatee's identity, but
also that such delusion bore directly on and influenced thr
execution of the purported codicils.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County denying petition for probate of holographic
documents claimed to be be codicils to a will. C. M. Monroe,
Judge. Affirmed.
George R. McClenahan for Appellant.
Luce, Forward, Kunzel & Scripps and Edgar A.. Lnce for
Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Harriet Palmer filed a petition for probate
of two holographic documents claimed to be codicils to the
last will and testament of Willinore M. Fosselman. One reads:
"I give and bequeath to my friend, Harriet Palmer, the
sum of ten thousand 10,000 June 17th 1953 to be paid to her
after my death (death).
Willinore M. Fosselman
4656 - 49th St.
San Diego, Cal."
The other reads:
"J an. 12th, 1955
•• When I die, I want this house to be given to Mrs. Harriet
Palmer for her to live in if she chooses.
Willinore Fosselman
4656 - 49th St."
Charles F. Salkeld, as executor, and Adele Marsh Rowe,
residuary legatee under the will, contested the admission of
these documents to probate on the ground that :Mrs. Fossel·
man lacked the mental capacity to make a valid codicil at
the times she executed them.
After a trial without a jury the court found:
" ... that at the time said two purported codicils ... were
written, dated and signed, and continuously up to the death
of said decedent, s,h~'was suffering from senile dementia and
was of such mental incompetency as to render her incapable
of executing a Will, and was suffering from an insane delusion
to the effect that Harriet Palmer was an old family retainer
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who had been in her family many years previously, and was
a very old friend; and that in fact the said decedent actually
had known the said Ha'rriet Palmer as an employee of only
a few months standing when the said delusion became fixed,
which said delusion was the effective cause of the execution
of said instruments and which instruments would not have
been executed by the said testator were it not for the said
insane delusion." (Finding VII.)
u. . • that at the time of the execution of each of said
instruments and continuously up to the time of her death
the said decedent was mentally incompetent to execute a Will
or codicil and had not sufficient mental capacity to be able to
understand the nature of the acts she was doing nor to understand and recollect the nature and situation of her property
or her relation. to the persons who had claims upon her
bounty. . . . " (Finding VIII.)
Accordingly, the court entered judgment denying the admission of the two documents to probate. Petitioner appeals
on the ground that the findings of the trial court are not
supported by substantial evidence.
Prior to April, 1950, Mrs. Fosselman resided in New York
City. She maintained with the Bankers Trust Company a
securities-custodian account, which at the time of her death
was of the approximate value of $460,000. The account was
under the supervision of Charles F. Salkeld, a vice-president
of the company, upon whom she came to rely for personal
and business advice. In New York, Mrs. Fosselman was
considered to be intelligent and quite alert for her age.
In April, 1950, Mrs. Fosselman moved to San Diego, California, intending to make her home there. Shortly after
her arrival in San Diego, she tripped and fell in a hotel lobby
and suffered a broken hip. She was treated by Dr. R. L.
Hippen and removed to Mercy Hospital, where she remained
for about seven weeks. While in the hospital she executed a
win disposing of her entire ~tate and appointing Mr. Salkeld
executor. At about the same time she asked Mr. Salkeld and
Ralph Bullock, her New York attorney, to take charge of
her financial affairs, and to that end she gave Mr. Bullock a
general power of attorney. Edgar A. Luce was appointed her
local attorney and charged with the management of her affairs
in San Diego. '.thereafter all bills were presented to Mr.
Luce, who transmitted them to New York for payment. A
small checking account, the balance not to exceed $500, was
established in Mrs. Fosselman's name in a San Diego bank.
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Mrs. Fosselman drew checks on that account for miscellaneous
items until shortly before her death. On several occasions
Mr. Bullock thought it advisable to obtain Mrs. Fosselman's
consent to the transfer of funds or securities, and for that
purpose Mr. Luce obtained Mrs. Fosselman's signature.
Upon her release from the hospital, Mrs. Fosselman was
moved to a house, purchased with her funds, at 4656 49th
Street in San Diego. She was attended throughout the day
and night by three nurses working in shifts of eight hours
each. A chauffeur was employed to take her on afternoon
drives. Dr. Hippen remained her physician and visited her
occasionally. Mr. Luce visited her on the average of once a
week.
Petitioner was one of the nurses employed to care for
Mrs. Fosselman. She had served originally as a relief nurse,
.but upon the death of one of the regular nurses in 1952,
she was employed to attend Mrs. Fosselman regularly during
the hours from 7 a. m. to 3 p. m., and she served in that
capacity until Mrs. Fosselman's death. It is undisputed that
:Mrs. Fosselman appeared to be fond of petitioner. It is also
undisputed that Mrs. Fosselman appeared to be equally fond
of the other nurses.
Mrs. Fosselman died on March 25, 1955, at the age of 88
years. She was the last survivor of a family of 10 children
and left as surviving relatives only nieces and nephews.
The purported codicil dated June 17, 1953, was first discovered after Mrs. Fosselman's death. Petitioner testified that
she had been requested to clean out Mrs. Fosselman's desk
and that in doing so she found a sealed envelope wrapped in
tissue. The purported codicil was in the envelope. Petitioner
testified that she had no knowledge of it before that time.
The purported codicil dated January 12,1955, was delivered
to petitioner by Mrs. Fosselman during her lifetime. Petitioner testified that on January 12, 1955, Mrs. Fosselman
stated that there was something she wanted to do before she
forgot it and that l\Irs. Fosselman handed her a piece of
paper, stating, "Here, honey, you read this." Petitioner
read it and replied, "Well, you don't have to do anything
for me," and Mrs. Fosselman said, "Well, I know it. Do
you think it is all right T" Petitioner replied, "Yes, it is."
Mrs. Fosselman then stated, "Now, if you don't think this is
all right, you take it to a lawyer and have it checked." Mrs.
Fosselman then tod the paper to the living room and later
returned and handed petitioner a sealed envelope, stating,
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"Now, you are not to open this until after I die or pass
away. " She opened the envelope after Mrs. Fosselman's
death and found that it contained the paper that Mrs. Fosselman had shown her.
Petitioner testified that on January 12, 1955, Mrs. Fosselman seemed to be aware of what she was doing, that her
conversations were logical and reasonable, and that there was
nothing in her conduct that would suggest that she was
insane. "She was just like she had always heen." With
respect to Mrs. Fosselman's mental condition on June 17,
1953, petitioner gave her opinion that Mrs. Fosselman was
not insane, that in the middle of 1953, Mrs. Fosselman seemed
to be aware of what was going on in the world, who her
relatives were, and that she had some property. Petitioner
admitted that Mrs. Fosselman thought that she had known
petitioner in Kansas City as an employee of Mrs. Fosselman's
mother and that they were old friends; that when petitioner
would correct her and explain that such was not the case, Mrs.
Fosselman would say, "Now, that's right," but would subsequently reassert that she had known petitioner in Kansas
City; that Mrs. Fosselman sometimes thought she was in New
York; that she sometimes did not know that she owned the
49th Street house, but thought that she rented it from a
landlord who was demanding an increase in rent; that she
often felt that she did not have sufficient money to pay the
household help; that she repeated herself constantly; and
that Mrs. Fosselman insisted that the nurse who died in 1952
had stolen some chairs that in fact had been given away by
Mrs. Fosselman in New York. Petitioner did not think that .
this behavior was illogical or irrational. She testified that
she would not consider a person insane unless he was totally
unconscious of his environment.
Several women who were neighbors of Mrs. Fosselman and
who had visited her occasionally during the last five years
of her life testified that she was able to converse with them
about simple domestic matters and that she was not insane.
Mr. Salkeld visited Mrs. Fosselman five times during the
last five years of her life. He testified that her mental condition started deteriorating in October, 1950, and that from that
time until her death she became progressively confused. He
testified that she remembered old events but nothing recent;
that at times she,thought she was in New York; that she
constantly thought she did not have enough money and that
when he tried to explain her property to her, she could Dot
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"absorb it"; that she thought she had once owned a house
in New York and wondered what had become of it, although
she had never owned a house there; that she referred to her
deceased brothers as being alive; and that on his last visit
in March, 1954, he went to see her on the afternoon of one
day and the morning of the next day, but Mrs. Fosselman
was unable to recognize him. It was his opinion that from
the fall of 1952 until the time of her death Mrs. Fosselman
was unable to comprehend the nature and extent of her property or her relation to those who would be the natural objects
of h~r bounty.
Mr. Luce recounted in detail his weekly visits with Mrs.
Fosselman. He testified that except for one occasion, on
January 31, 1951, Mrs. Fosselman was unable to converse
intelligently with him about her property or business affairs;
that she could not tell him about her accident in the hotel;
that she could not understand the settlement that was made
with the hotel's insurer; that despite his repeated explanations, she could not understand the source of the money that
was being used to pay the nurses and household expenses;
that she referred to some deceased members of her family
as being alive and thought that others were dead, who in fact
were alive; that she persistently claimed that petitioner had
worked for her mother in Kansas City and was an old friend
despite repeated explanations that petitioner was not even
born at the time referred to. Mr. Luce gave his opinion
that from 1952 until the time of her death Mrs. Fosselman
was unable to comprehend the nature and extent of her
property or her relation to those who would have a natural
claim upon her bounty.
Dr. Hippen testified that Mrs. Fosselman was unable to
comprehend what was going on around her; that she was
never "completely associated about time"; that she frequently
thought she was in New York City; that she did not "associate" the persons around her "as being nurses" and "never
did quite comprehend who they were or what they were and
she frequently got them mixed up with people she had known
in the past"; that she thought she was destitute and frequently expressed the fear that she would be unable to pay
his bill; that from 1952 on she was suffering from senile dementia, a generalized softening of the brain owing to impaired
blood supply, and t.hat in his opinion, Mrs. Fosselman, from
1952 until the tilJ)e of her death, was unable to comprehend
the nature and extent of her property or her relation to those
.who would be the natural objects of her bounty.
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Lola R. Stephens, one of the nurses attending Mrs. Fosselman, testified that Mrs. Fosselman had stated many times
that petitioner worked for Mrs. Fosselman's mother, although
Mrs. Stephens repeatedly corrected her; that Mrs. F(JSSelman
could not understand any reading; that she was confused 8.11
to where she was; and that she thought that her brothers
would pay her bills, although her brothers were dead.
Mortimer Lumpkin, Mrs. Fosselman's chauffeur, testified
that Mrs. Fosselman thought that she had known petitioner in
Kansas City and that she often thought she was in New York.
Dr. Carl Lengyel, a psychiatrist to whose qualification counsel stipulated, in answer to a long hypothetical question based
upon the evidence, stated his opinion that from 1952 until
t4e time of her death Mrs. Fosselman was suffering from
brain disease, probably arteriosclerosis, and was of unsound
mind, and that during that period she could not comprehend
the nature or extent of her property or her relation to those
who would be the natural objects of her bounty.
The Finding of General Testamentary Incompetency
Is Supported by the Evidence.
Relying on the well established rule that successfully to
contest a will on the ground of lack of capacity a contestant
must prove testamentary incompetency at the time of execution of the will (Estate of Lingenfelter, 38 Cril.2d 571, 580
[241 P.2d 990] ; Estate of Perkins, 195 Cal. 699, 703 [235 P.
45]), petitioner contends that the finding that Mrs. Fosselman
lacked testamentary capacity at the times she executed the
purported codicils is not supported by the evidence. Petitioner points out that none of the witnesses for contestants
testified as to Mrs. Fosselman's mental condition on June 17,
1953 and January 12,1955, the days on which she executed
the purported codicils. She urges that the only evidence of
Mrs. Fosselman's mental condition on June 17, 1953 is the
purported codicil itself and that it discloses no incompetency,
and that the only evidence of Mrs. Fosselman's mental condition on January 12, 1955 is the testimony of petitioner and
the purported codicil itself and that this evidence tends to
show that Mrs. Fosselman had testamentary capacity.
[1] Testamentary incompetency on a given day, however,
may be proved by evidence of incompetency at times prior to
and after the day in question. (Estate of Perkins, supra, 195
Cal. at 703; Estate ~f Lingenfelter, su.pra, 38 Ca1.2d at 580;
see Vitale v. Vitale; 147 Ca1.App.2d 665, 669-670 [305 P.2d
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690].) [2] Once it is shown that testamentary incompetency exists and that it is caused by a mental disorder of a
general and continuous nature, the inference is reasonable
(see Estate of Baker, 176 Cal. 430, 437-438 [168 P. 881];
Vitale v. Vitale, supra). perhaps there is even a legal presumption (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 32; see Estate of
Schwartz, 67 Cal.App.2d 512, 521, 522 [155 P.2d 76] ; Byrne
v. Fulkerson, 254 Mo. 97, 123 [162 S.W. 171]; Bever v.
Spangler, 93 Iowa 576, 601 [61 N.W. 1072]) that the incompetency continues to exist. Such an inference is particularly strong in a case such as this in which the decedent was
suffering from senile dementia, a mental disorder that becomes
progressively worse. (Byrne v. Fulkerson, supra, 254 Mo. at
121-122, 123; Bever v. Spangler, supra, 93 Iowa at 597.)
"Senile dementia begins gradually, is progressive in character
and in its advanced stages 'the brain is well-nigh stripped of
its functions.' The difficulty lies in determining the point at
which in its progress it has so impaired the faculties that they
fall below the mark of legal capacity.... " (Byrne v. Fulkerson, supra, 254 Mo. at 121; see Page on Wills, Lifetime ed.,
vol. 1, p. 284, § 138.) [3] In the testimony of Mr. Salkeld,
Mr. Luce, Dr. Hippen, and Dr. Lengyel there is an abundance
of evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that from 1952 until the time of her death Mrs. Fosselman was suffering from senile dementia in an advanced stage
and that she could not comprehend the extent and character
of her property or her relation to those who would be the
natural objects of her bounty. Petitioner's testimony, the
purported codicils themselves, and the fact that Mrs. Fosselman drew checks on a small account established in her name
and that on several occasions Mr. Bullock thought it advisable
to obtain her consent to the transfer of funds or securities
constitute evidence that conflicts with the evidence presented
by contestants. The trial court resolved that conflict and
found that the decedent was incompetent. We cannot say as
a matter of law that the finding was unreasonable.
The Finding that the Decedent Was Suffering from an Insane
Delusion as to Pet'itioner's Identity is S11pported
by the Evidence.
[48.] The evidence supporting the finding of an insane delusion is even stronger than the evidence supporting the
Anding of general'incompett'llce. There is abundant evidence
that Mrs. Fosselman persistently claimed that petitioner was
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an old friend who had worked for Mrs. Fosselman's mother in
Kansas City despite repeated explanations to the contrary.
Petitioner herself testified that Mrs. Fosselman entertained
that belief. The only evidence that Mrs. Fosselman was ever
able to rid herself of this delusion is petitioner's testimony
that when petitioner would explain to Mrs. Fosselman that
she was mistaken, Mrs. Fosselman would say, "Now, that's
right. " Petitioner admits, however, that shortly thereafter
Mrs. Fosselman would reassert her unfounded belief.
The Finding that the Insane Delusion Was the Effective
Cause of the Execution of the Purported Codicils Is
Supported by the Evidence.
[5J The burden was upon contestants to prove not only
that Mrs. Fosselman was suffering from the insane delusion
but that that delusion "bore directly upon and influenced
the creation and terms" of the purported codicils. (Estate of
Perkins, supra, 195 Cal. at 704.) [4bJ Petitioner points to
the uncontradicted testimony that Mrs. Fosselman was fond
of petitioner and contends that it could be inferred therefrom that the purported codicils were the result of that
affection and not the insane delusion. The court found,
however, that the purported codicils were the result of the
insane delusion, and that conclusion too is reasonably inferable
from the evidence. Although it is undisputed that Mrs.
Fosselman was fond of petitioner, it is also undisputed that
she was equally fond of the other nurses. It may have been
significant to the trial court that no bequests were made to
any of the other nurses. We cannot say as a matter of law
that the trial court could not find the facts as it did.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred in the jUdgment.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance, but
I cannot refrain from commenting upon the gracious declaration in the majority opinion, after narrating the overwhelming
evidence in support of the finding of the trial court on the
issue of testamentary incompetency of the testatrix, that: "We
cannot say as a matter of law that the finding was unreasonable." How any finding of fact based upon sufficient compe·
tent evidence could be anything but "reasonable" is beyond
my comprehension. But for a majority of this court to uphold
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a finding of testamentary incompetency or undue influence in
a will contest is such an unusual event that it can only be
characterized by unusual language. The majority opinion
also states: uOnce it is shown that testamentary incompetency exists and that it is caused by a mental disorder of a
general and continuous nature, the inference is reasonable
[citations] ... that the incompetency continues to exist." It
is not my understanding that the reasonableness of an inference or a conclusion reached by a trier of fact on sufficient
competent evidence is for this court to determine. On the
other hand, when the claim is made that the evidence is
insufficient to support the finding of the trier of fact, the
function of this court is limited to a determination of whether
there is any substantial evidence, including inferences or presumptions which may arise from proven facts, to support
the conclusion reached, and when a trier of fact has resolved
an issue of fact, its determination is binding upon an appellate
court unless the evidence against such determination is such
that reasonable minds could come to no other but a contrary
conclusion than that reached by the trier of fact. In this
process the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from
the proven facts is for the trier of fact and not for an
appellate court. The above quoted language from the majority opinion gives rise to a new concept of appellate court
review of factual determinations by trial courts, which concept
I assume will be invoked only in will contest cases when this
court sees fit to affirm a determination by a trial court that
a will is invalid because of the testamentary incompetency of
the testator or was procured by the undue influence of the
proponent of the will. As I have heretofore pointed out in
my dissenting opinions (Estate of Lingenfelter, 38 Ca1.2d 571
at page 588 [241 P.2d 990] ; Estate of Welch, 43 Ca1.2d 173
at page 181 [272 P.2d 512] ; Estate of Bullock, 140 Cal.App.
2d 944, 950 [295 P.2d 954, 297 P.2d 633] ; Estate of Keeney,
140 Cal.App.2d 688, 694 [295 P.2d 479, 297 P.2d 636]), that
with one single exception (Estate of TeeZ, 25 Ca1.2d 520 [154
P.2d 384]) the majority of this court has taken the position
that the determination of the factual issues in a will contest
is the function of this court and not of the trial court or jury,
thus repealing, by judicial fiat, section 19 of article VI of
the Constitution of California and section 371 of the Probate
Code. While the de~ision in the case at bar may seem to be a
departure from the policy heretofore followed. I am convinced
that the same legal philosophy which I have denounced
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in my dissents in the above cited cases still prevails and
will be invoked in future cases involving will contests so long
as this court remains as it is now constituted.
In my opinion the evidence of testamentary incompetency
is no stronger in this case than it was in any of the cases
which I have hereinbefore cited, which the majority of this
court held, as a matter of law, was insufficient to invalidate the
will involved in those cases, and while a correct conclusion
is reached by the majority in the case at bar, the reasoning
of the majority in arriving at such conclusion is out of harmony with the settled rule with respect to the function and
power of an appellate court to review the d~termination of
an issue of fact by a trial court.

